The Anthropology of Justice

Why do we tolerate the intolerable? The annals of laws around the world and for all recorded history identify delay as not only a defect of justice but also record the satisfaction of receiving justice even when it arrives not only late but too late. There is something in human nature that makes us yearn for vindication at whatever cost of time, stress and distraction?

Professor Fernanda Pirie of Oxford in “The Rule of Laws” makes the case that laws are coeval with society; that laws arise when the mechanisms of their enforcement are not yet effective or credible. She supports this by documenting the laws which existed in ancient societies as disparate as ancient Babylon and Ireland under the Gaelic Kings.

Reaching back further into our many histories, the universality of rules in human communities is well-supported by indigenous legal traditions and laws operating in indigenous communities.

We can be confident that if another people are contacted by outsiders for the first time, they will be found to have rules respecting family relations, property and conduct. People are rule-creating, rule-hungry creatures. We crave not only the resolution of disputes: we want them resolved according to law.

That universal hunger for rules is intimately related to the value of justice—even justice delayed. The satisfaction in being vindicated goes beyond the mere conclusion to the dispute. Although there is always a gap—and sometimes a chasm—between the means and ends of justice it carries a force that resonates deeply within us. In short, law is rarely amoral, and there are both internal and external consequences for the resolution of the dispute—for the individuals and often the immediate and broader community.

As lawyers the dignity and place of our profession rests on this fundamental trait and although we may say justice delayed is justice denied we don’t truly believe it—and for good reasons. By treating delay as an unfortunate feature of the justice system we depend on all its other valued traits to maintain credibility. Our need for a rule-governed community means we will forgive much.

How do these observations influence efforts to achieve timeliness? First, we must articulate the consequences of delay in ways that are more persuasive than formulaic or ideological. We must be both utilitarian and philosophical in doing so. Second, we should better understand the limits of the legal system’s capacity to draw on the goodwill it enjoys. A world of  transnational law may well partially eclipse national legal systems but also represent new frontiers of law-ordered conduct. Finally, we should capitalize on whatever means by which modern systems have the potential to address timeliness in ways that are ameliorative and support the human desire for justice.